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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant i _ L tah I ode \nn. § 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1953, as
amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
•. Whether IN loon w as properly terminated from, his position with t h e U t a h D e p a r t m e n t
of Natural Resources (hereinafter the "Department"), including the following issues:
1.

Whether Moon's participation in a single wildlife incident was sufficient to

merit Moon's termination

from
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el ntes to the termination of a state

employee. This involves a determination as to whether the Department correctly applied
relevant policies, rules, and statutes when it upheld Moon's termination. In making this
determination, the Court should apply a correctio.
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Rcvicw Board's Decision and Final

Agency Action entered on February 9, 1998. R., ljJ-155. The issues were preserved for
appeal by the filing of a Petition for Writ of Review on March 10, 1998.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Besides Utah case law on point, other determinative rules include Utah Administrative
Code, R 137-1-20(1) and R 477-i l-l(3)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

was employed by the State of Utah for over 15 years, and who has dedicated his career to the
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State of Utah, can be dismissed for a single misdemeanor wildlife violation. Under previous
case law, Utah regulations, and basic concepts of fairness, the answer to this question must
be "no".
Randy Moon (hereinafter "Moon") has been employed with the Department since
1993, and by the state of Utah as a Science Advisor to the governor since 1982. In that time,
Moon was a well-respected state employee, with a work record free from any write-ups or
disciplinary measures. R., 824-833. On December 7, 1996, Moon went with his sons, Ryan
and Nathan, on a hunting expedition into northern Utah. Only Nathan had a license to hunt
antelope; Moon merely accompanied him, and did not carry a gun. During this trip, Moon
watched as his son Nathan shot an antelope. Unfortunately, it turned out that Nathan was
actually inside the border of Wyoming at the time he shot the antelope. When later
confronted with this fact by a Wyoming officer, Moon was issued a citation for "aiding and
assisting" his son in the unlawful taking of an antelope out of season. Nathan was cited for
the taking of the antelope. Moon did not challenge the misdemeanor citation issued,
cooperated fully with the authorities, and paid a fine. Nathan, who was 19 at the time, was
immediately terminated by the Department for his actions. R., 144-146, 859-879, 880-893,
962-963.
Moon was not terminated at the time this incident occurred. Instead, Moon was
suspended,

pending an investigation into his past work record. After an extensive

investigation, the Department alleged that Moon had engaged in an "abuse of position" in
October, 1996. The Department then terminated Moon on February 11, 1997 for both the
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wildlife violation and this new charge. Moon appealed his termination to the Career Service
Review Board (hereinafter "CSRB"). After a Step 5 evidentiary hearing, a CSRB hearing
officer upheld Moon's termination. Moon then appealed the decision to the CSRB for a 6th
level review. R., 34-52, 893-897
The CSRB conducted an appellate review of the Step 5 hearing, and held that Moon
did not commit an "abuse of position". However, the CSRB found that because Moon had
committed the wildlife violation, that violation alone was sufficient to terminate Moon. It
is this holding which Moon now attacks as a matter of law.R., 133-55.
Moon did not shoot the antelope in question, and, at the time, did not even know that
an infraction had been committed. The facts in this case clearly show that many hunters have
been unsure as to where Utah ends and Wyoming begins at the very spot Moon's son shot
the antelope. In fact, citations are often not issued to hunters in that area. The topography of
this particular area makes it practically impossible for one to know the location of the state
boundary. R., 872-879. As such, Moon clearly lacked the "culpability, knowledge and
control" required by the Utah Supreme Court for termination. Indeed, a very similar CSRB
case came to exactly the same conclusion in an incident more egregious than this one. See,
Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver. 3 PRB 22
(1986).
Furthermore, the penalty of termination requires an investigation into mitigating
factors, including whether this severe penalty is proportionate to the infraction committed.
See section III, infra. Such an investigation was not made by the CSRB, at either the 5th or
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6th level. This omission denied Moon of rights protected by Utah regulatory guidelines and
precedent established by prior case law. In fact, Moon's termination was more severe than
any punishment handed down in the past by the Department or the CSRB for similar
infractions. Had the CSRB performed such an investigation, Moon's termination could not
have been upheld.
Finally, Moon's participation in the wildlife incident took place while he was off-duty.
Therefore, before he can be terminated for such conduct, a nexus must be established
between his off-duty conduct and his ability to perform the tasks required by his position. See
section IV, infra. No such showing was made by the Department. Nevertheless, the CSRB
held that Moon's termination was appropriate. This ruling is incorrect as a matter of law.
For each of these reasons, the Court should overturn Moon's termination.
Moon should be reinstated, with back pay and benefits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Before taking his position with the Department, Moon had an impressive

employment record. After receiving a Master's degree in environmental biology, Moon
earned a Pd.D. in genetics at the University of Hawaii. Moon then worked as genetic section
manager at Research Park, University of Utah. Later, Moon was hired by Governor
Matheson as the State Science Advisor. Moon continued in this position for the next 11
years, until 1993. R., 824-827.

4

2.

Moon then transferred to the Department in 1993. From that time until

January, 1997, Moon had no record of discipline or other employment-related problems.1
Moon's initial position with the Department was as Assistant Director of Wildlife Resources.
In 1995, he moved into the position of Fields and Programs Administrator. In total, Moon
has provided over 15 years of service to the state of Utah, with no disciplinary action taken
against him. R., 830-833; 15 CSRB/H.O. 218 atp.l.
3.

On December 7, 1996, Moon went with his sons Nathan (19) and Ryan (18)

on a hunting expedition into Woodruff, a hunting area in northern Utah. Nathan had acquired
all necessary Utah licenses and tag for the trip, and was the only one actually hunting. Moon,
who was simply driving his boys, was off duty at the time of this excursion. R. 144, 859862.
4.

Later that day, the Moons crossed the border, which had been mismarked, and

then headed down a dirt road which angled southwest into Utah. Moon wanted to be sure that
any hunting his son did would be done in Utah territory, so they drove in a direction they
believed took them deeper into Utah. With no definite markings of any kind to guide them,
however, it was unclear exactly where one border ended and another began. R., 863-872.
5.

At this time, Moon and his sons noticed a group of antelope running towards

them. As the antelope crossed the dirt road, Nathan raised his gun and shot at one of the

Moon's record as State Science Advisor is similarly unblemished.
5

antelope. Moon still believed he was in Utah.2 Moon had checked a Utah map, and the map
indicated that they were in Utah. R. at 145, 873-876.
6.

The area the Moons were in at this time was very open, while the roads

followed no definite direction, and no definite landmarks marked the way. As far as Moon
knew, he and his sons were still in Utah. R., 872-879, 960.
7.

Moon and his sons began driving southwest again, when they saw off to the

east a fallen antelope. Nathan then got out of the car and went to the antelope to see if it was
wounded. Moon never left his vehicle. Nathan approached the wounded antelope and killed
it. Nathan then tagged the antelope with a Utah tag, and brought the antelope back to the car.
The antelope was then loaded into the vehicle and the Moons returned to their home. At all
times, Moon still believed that he and his sons were in Utah. R. at 146, 880-890, 962-963.
8.

The following Tuesday, a Wyoming officer came to speak with Moon and his

son, Nathan. The officer informed Moon that the antelope had been shot in Wyoming, and
therefore taken without proper tags. Moon cooperated fully with the officer, and ultimately
paid the fine assessed. Moon received a Wyoming citation for "aiding or assisting" in the
taking of an antelope in Wyoming in a closed season. Nathan was cited for the taking of the
antelope. This was the first time that Moon knew he had been in Wyoming. R., 889-893; 15
CSRB/H.0.218atp.4.

2

At no time did Moon engage in any actual hunting. The only person to hunt on this trip
was Nathan.
6

9.

Moon was not terminated by the Department for this incident. Instead, he was

placed on suspension pending an investigation. Prior to this incident, Moon had never
received discipline of any kind in the twenty years he worked for the state. Moon's son, on
the other hand, was immediately terminated from his seasonal position with the Department.
R. at 146-147, 893-897.
10.

The Department's investigation came up with the charge of "abuse of position",

for an incident which occurred in October, 1997. R., 350-352. Moon was then terminated
after this investigation had been completed, for both the wildlife infraction and the "abuse
of position" charge. R., 147.
11.

Moon appealed this decision to the CSRB. At a Step 5 hearing, Moon's

termination was upheld on the basis of a "pattern of abuse", namely, the wildlife incident and
Moon's "abuse of discretion".R., 34-52.
12.

Moon appealed this decision to the Career Service Review Board. At a Step

6 formal adjudicative preceding, the Board held that Moon did not engage in an abuse of
position. However, the Board held that the wildlife incident was alone sufficient to merit
termination. R., 133-55.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Moon fs Participation in a Single Wildlife Incident is Insufficient to Merit Termination.
The CSRB3 properly found that Moon did "aid and/or counsel in taking antelope
during a closed season", a Wyoming misdemeanor subject to a fine. R., 150. The CSRB did

From this point forward, reference to the "CSRB" decision means the Step 6 review.
7

not find that this act was intentional, but stated that Moon "knew or should have known" he
was in Wyoming at the time of the incident. R., 150,153. Moon does not dispute the
infraction occurred, and in fact cooperated with authorities once he learned of the infraction.
R., 892-895. However, as a matter of law, this act alone does not merit termination. As the
only black mark on an otherwise untarnished work record, this sole charge does not warrant
the sanction imposed.
This is true for the following reasons.
I.

Prior Case Law Establishes That Termination Was an Excessive Penalty
It is well established in administrative proceedings that like penalties should be

imposed for like offenses. Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 949 P.2d 746,
762 (Utah App. 1997). To this end, the case of Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert
O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22 (1986), serves as an example to which this
Court should compare Moonfs conduct. Weaver's actions are similar to, if not more
egregious than Moon's actions. However, Weaver's termination by the Department was
overturned by the CSRB. Weaver's reinstatement shows that Moon's termination was
inappropriate.
17.

Acts of Other Department Officers and Employees Demonstrate a Pattern Within
the Department: Moon fs Single, Unintentional Wildlife Violation is Insufficient
to Warrant Termination. Therefore His Termination Was Unfair and Arbitrary.
Moon introduced to the CSRB numerous examples of similarly situated Department

employees who were not terminated though they committed violations more egregious than
that committed by Moon in this case. See, e.g., R. at 79-80. These examples show that
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Moon's termination was improper and unduly severe, as it is disproportionate to the offense,
and would be inconsistent with the Department's prior practices.

///.

Mitigating Factors and Circumstances Were Ignored in Upholding Moon9s
Termination.
Utah case law and regulatory law requires that, before a state employee is terminated,

the decision-maker will contemplate various mitigating factors. As one CSRB hearing
officer has put it, there are really two questions involved: first, did the employee commit an
infraction worthy of termination; and, second, under all the facts and circumstances of the
case, is it fair to terminate this employee despite his conduct. UDOT v. Thomas V.
Rasmussen. 2 PRB 19 (1986). The CSRB effectively ignored this second question,
contributing one sentence of space to "mitigating factors". This is a legally deficient
analysis, and is also regrettable, since an analysis of mitigating factors in this case would
have heavily favored Moon.
IV.

The "Nexus" Required by Law for Termination Based on Off-Duty Activities is
Absent.
Finally, since Moon's infraction took place while he was off-duty, a showing of nexus

is required in order uphold a termination based on such conduct. Utah Dept. of Transp. v..
824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1997). The CSRB's decision shows no nexus between Moon's
infraction and his ability to perform his duties as Field and Parks Administrator, and should
therefore be overturned.
For each of these reasons, Moon's termination was grossly excessive in proportion to
the wildlife infraction. Moon should therefore be reinstated with back pay and benefits.
9

ARGUMENT
Moon's Citation for Aiding and Assisting in Wyoming is Not Sufficient to
Terminate His Employment
I.

Prior Case Law Establishes That Termination Was an Excessive Penalty.

Moon was terminated by the Department for his alleged involvement in two unrelated
incidents. These included his participation in the wildlife incident and an alleged "abuse of
position". R., 38. When Moon challenged this decision to the CSRB, the CSRB held that
Moon had not engaged in an "abuse of position". R., 134. However, the CSRB still held that
Moon's participation in the wildlife incident was alone sufficient to uphold his termination.
R., 134. Prior CSRB case law belies this holding. The CSRB decision of Division of Parks
and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D.Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22, establishes that
termination was an excessive penalty in light of Moon's relatively minor infraction, and that
Moon did not exhibit the culpability, knowledge and control necessary to justify termination.
The CSRB held that Moon had engaged in an unlawful hunting activity in Wyoming
by aiding and assisting his son, Nathan, in the taking of an antelope during a closed season,
and that this act warranted termination. R., 144-155 This holding was based on the following
facts: Moon went with his sons on a hunting trip into Northern Utah. His son Nathan was the
only one who had a permit to hunt. R., 144. The three drove towards the Wyoming border,
when they spotted an antelope herd. R., 145. Nathan fired once at the running herd. Id. The
Moons spoke to the driver of a vehicle chasing the vehicle, id., and then spoke to the Chens,
another couple in the area, who asked Moon, "aren't we in Wyoming?". Moon replied, "yes,
according to the man in that truck". Id. The Moons then drove in various directions when
10

they came upon a fallen antelope. R., 145-146. Nathan got out of their car and shot the
antelope. R., 146. Ryan and Nathan then tagged the antelope, dragged it to the car, and gutted
it, burying the gut pile. Id. Moon did not shoot the antelope, or drag or gut the antelope, but
instructed the boys on how to gut the animal. Id. The Moons then took the antelope home
with them. Id.
The CSRB concluded that termination for Moon's participation in this incident alone
was supported by just cause; that this single act was sufficient to justify the penalty of
termination. However, this decision flies in the face of prior CSRB case law.
In a more egregious case, Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson
and D.Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22, the CSRB examined the propriety of terminating a
Department official (Weaver) for his participation in an illegal shooting and cutting-up of a
bear cub. Weaver was a regional manager and a peace officer for the Division of Parks and
Recreation.

Weaver, Robert Anderson (another Department manager), and several

Department employees were part of an elk hunting party, when Anderson unlawfully shot
and killed a black bear cub out of season. Id., at pp. 10-11. Weaver was present when
Anderson killed the bear, but took no part in the shooting. Id. Once the bear had been shot,
Weaver decided that the bear should be moved. This was later called "concealment" by the
Department. Id., at pp. 11-12. Weaver then suggested that the men take "souvenirs" from
the cub, meaning small pieces of the cub itself. Although Weaver did not cut-up the bear
himself, he was present as the other men - including Anderson - began to do so. Id. Once the
hunting party returned home, neither Weaver nor Anderson reported the incident. Id.
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Weaver was accused by the Department of both "malfeasance" and "nonfeasance" in
office. As a member of management, he was told by the Department that he should have
been a "leader" in reporting the incident, that he had stood by and watched as the bear was
torn apart, and then took part in a scheme to "cover up" the incident. Id at p.2. Weaver was
subsequently terminated by the Department.
Weaver's termination was overturned by the CSRB, and Weaver was assessed a sixweek penalty, after which he was reinstated with back pay and benefits. Id, at p.27. This
decision was based largely on a comparison of Weaver's actions with those of Anderson, who
actually shot and cut-up the bear. Id

The CSRB noted that Weaver had watched and, at

times, directed, but did not participate in the killing of the bear. Id. at pp. 11-12, 27. The
CSRB therefore upheld the termination of Anderson, but reinstated Weaver, stating that, "[i]t
is reasonable as well as justifiable that their respective penalties individually manifest that
difference based upon their degree of culpability." Id., at p. 27.
"Culpability", as noted by the CSRB, was one of the requirements necessary to satisfy
the standards for termination for "just cause". Id. The CSRB noted that, according to the
Utah Supreme Court, "culpability, knowledge and control must be present" in order to
terminate an employee such as Moon. Id., citing Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129
(Utah 1985). The CSRB held that, while Anderson's actions manifested the degree of
culpability necessary for termination for cause, Weaver's did not.
The actions of Moon in this case are less culpable than those committed by Weaver.
On an off-duty hunting trip, Weaver, a regional manager and a peace officer, watched as

12

Anderson illegally shot a bear cub. 3 PRB 22, p. 11-14. On an off-duty hunting trip, Moon,
a Fields and Programs Administrator, watched from his car as his son shot an antelope. R.,
36, 146. Weaver knew that the killing of the bear cub was illegal. 3 PRB 22, p. 11-14.
Moon did not know that Nathan's act of shooting was illegal at the time, because he did not
know he was in Wyoming. R., 44, 149 (employing "knew or should have known" standard),
872-879. Weaver directed others to move the bear, possibly in an attempt to hide the carcass.
3 PRB 22, p. 12. Moon did not attempt to cover up the incident as Weaver did; instead,
when confronted with the fact that he had been in Wyoming, Moon admitted his mistake. R.,
at 37, 889-893. Weaver suggested the other Department employees cut "souvenirs" from the
bear, in clear violation of the law. 3 PRB 22, p. 12. Moon never told his sons to engage in
illegal activities, but merely directed them on the appropriate, and - but for the location sound hunting procedures. R., 146,149. Weaver's leadership position in the Department,
influenced subordinates to disregard their duty, under the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics.
3 PRB 22, p. 14. Moon was present only with his sons, and therefore did not influence other
employees of the Department. Further, Moon did not contest the violation when informed of
it, and took immediate responsibility for even this inadvertent violation. R.,150, 889-893.
Finally, Weaver was not terminated, as he was not the one who shot and cut-up the bear. 3
PRB 22, p. 26-27. Moon was terminated from the Department, although he did not shoot or
cut the antelope. R., 155.
The similarities between this case and Anderson and Weaver are obvious. Like the
comparison between Dennis Weaver and Robert Anderson, Moon's penalty should reflect

13

the difference "based on [his] degree of culpability" and the culpability of Nathan (who was
terminated).
Such culpability, as well as knowledge and control, are lacking here. Moon submitted
testimony to the CSRB which showed that no one was very familiar with the particular area
involved, R., 960; that Moon did not know where the Utah border ended, R., 872-879; that
many hunters become confused in that area, icL at 1048-1059; that no real landmarks were
present, and that it is extremely difficult to tell where one state ends and another begins in
this particular area, kL; and that no one was sure exactly where the men were at the time id
at 314-315, 880. Therefore, without a showing of culpability, knowledge and control, both
the facts and law of Anderson and Weaver are applicable to this case, and show that Moon's
termination should be overturned.
Moreover, the CSRB's attempt to distinguish Anderson and Weaver is unconvincing.
The CSRB held that (1) Kehl v. Board of Review. 700 P.2d 1129, did not apply to cases
outside of the context of unemployment cases , R., 151, and (2) Moon's actions were more
akin to those of Anderson than Weaver. R., 152-154. These conclusions cannot be supported.
First, the holding in Kehl was explicitly adopted by the CSRB in the Anderson and
Weaver decision, and its application to such cases has never been rejected by this Court or
the Utah Supreme Court. In addition, Utah Administrative Code R 477-11-2 states that,
"[a]n employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause"

By definition this would require

some form of culpability. See, e.g., Thompson v. Civil Service Commission, 134 P.2d 188,
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194 (Utah 1943)("removal for cause...means inefficiency, incompetency or other kindred
qualifications").
Second, there is no support for the CSRB's finding that Moon's actions were more
like Anderson's acts than Weaver's in the Anderson and Weaver case. The CSRB found that
Moon's actions were more than an "idle bystander", and that he was chiefly responsible for
the unlawful taking of the antelope. R., 152. However, as noted above, Weaver's actions
were less "idle" than Moon's actions in this case, and were more involved with the actual
cutting-up and taking of an animal than those of Moon. The CSRB therefore erred in its
analysis which upheld Moon's termination for this single incident.
In sum, reference to the Anderson and Weaver decision shows that termination was
an excessive penalty in light of Moon's relatively minor infraction, and in light of the fact
that Moon did not exhibit the culpability, knowledge and control necessary to justify
termination. The CSRB's decision to uphold Moon's termination should therefore be
reversed.
II.

Acts of Other Department Officers and Employees Demonstrate a Pattern
Within the Department: Moon's Single, Unintentional Wildlife Violation
is Insufficient to Warrant Termination. Therefore His Termination Was
Unfair and Arbitrary.

An essential factor in a determination of proper punishment is whether the penalty an
employee receives is proportionate to the offense for which he is punished. To this end, one
of the requirements imposed upon the CSRB by the Utah Administrative Code is that the
CSRB assures the "correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes". R. 137-121(D)(3). Correct and consistent application of these policies and rules guarantees that each
15

employee is treated fairly and according to predictable standards. See, Lucas v. Murray City
Civil Service Commission. 949 P.2d 746, 762 (Utah App. 1997). Consistency of punishment
not only allows employees to know what is expected and accepted, but also is an element of
due process afforded each employee. See, Lunnen v. Utah Dept. Of Transp.. 886 P.2d 70,
73 (Utah App. 1994) ; see also David R. Bytheway v. Utah Dept. Of Pub. Safety. 13
CSRB/H.O. 191 (1996), at pp. 17,24 ("It is seen as essentially unfair to summarily discipline
someone - to take away his or her livelihood - without giving the employee prior
opportunities to conform to the expectations of the employer or to correct a mistake.")
However, the CSRB failed to follow R. 137-1-21(D)(3) in this case, and denied Moon a
consistent, proportionate penalty for his infraction when it terminated him for an
unintentional wildlife violation.
Moon presented to the CSRB numerous examples of other Department officers and
employees who had committed various wildlife infractions but had not been terminated for
such infractions. Moon argued that the fact that these similarly situated individuals were not
terminated shows that Moon was unfairly treated, and that his infraction did not merit such
a harsh penalty. However, the CSRB held as follows:
[W]hen these comparisons are scrutinized, Grievantfs actions: (1> were
committed by a person in a higher DWR managerial position than the other
employees, (2) compare unfavorably because many of the other employees
voluntarily turned themselves in and some even wrote themselves citations,
and (3) constituted big game poaching in a neighboring state...being subjected
to Wyoming's judicial punishment - which resulted in disgracing Utah's DWR
staff in particular, and the division in general.
R. at 154.
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While this statement may rationalize treating one or two cases differently than Moon's
situation, it simply cannot explain away the existence of numerous officers and employees
within the Department and elsewhere who have all engaged in similar infractions, and who
have not been terminated. R., 347, 349, 395, 919-924, 1139-1140. In each of these cases,
it is obvious that the Department had not considered the incidents involved "serious" enough
to warrant termination. Equally obvious, the infractions involved were no less "egregious"
than that committed by Moon.
Wayne Halverson, a Department employee, illegally shot at ravens from a vehicle
across a forest service road. He did not turn himself in because he did not know it had been
illegal He was cited and warned, but received probation rather than termination. R., 919920. Mike Hutchings, a park ranger, and Ron Hodson, a biologist, were both cited for illegal
hunting incidents, yet neither were terminated. R., 395. William Bates, a biologist,
participated in a felony violation by assisting in an illegal sheep hunt. Bates was not
terminated despite a second incident. Instead, he was merely suspended. R., 923-924. Kent
Summers, also a Department biologist, unlawfully took two elk. Summers was only fined.
Dennis Austin, another biologist, took sage grouse in a closed area. Austin was fined $15
and no other action was taken against him.R., 920-926.
The pattern, then, is clear: a single wildlife incident does not normally merit
termination within the Department.

Further, termination has been seen as particularly

inappropriate when, as is the case with Moon, the underlying infraction was committed by
mistake. The testimony of John Kimball, the man responsible for Moon's termination, makes
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clear that in the past, the Department has not terminated various employees who have
committed infractions unintentionally. Kimball testified that Randy Berger, an assistant
wildlife manager, illegally took an elk in a closed area. However, Kimball stated that Berger
was not terminated but was reprimanded. R., 346-347. Kimball's explanation was that
Berger killed the elk by "an honest mistake. He didn't go into it knowing that there was a
problem." I d Kimball also testified that two unnamed biologists were cited for hunting
pheasants in a closed area. The biologists were not terminated, because , as Kimball noted,
they were in a place that they "weren't as familiar with." R., 348-349.
Moon did not shoot an animal, but was cited for "aiding and assisting". Much like
the two biologists noted above, Moon was in an area he was unfamiliar with. He did not
know whether he was in Utah or Wyoming. In short, Moon made "an honest mistake."
Such acts have not warranted termination by the Department in the past.
As noted in David R. Bytheway v. Utah Dept. Of Pub. Safety, 13 CSRB/H.O. 191,
"there are obvious first offenses which should never be tolerated...such as smoking in a
dynamite factory, embezzlement, or assaulting a supervisor." 13 CSRB/H.O. 191 at 18.
Otherwise, "it is seen as essentially unfair to summarily discipline someone - to take away
their livelihood - without giving the employee prior opportunities to conform to the
expectations of the employer, or to correct a mistake." LI at 17, quoting Redeker, Discipline:
Policies and Procedures (1984) at p.20.
Normally, the Department has followed this sound policy, such as in the cases of
Randy Berger, Dennis Austin, and William Bates; indeed Bates was even retained after a
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second infraction. R., 923-924. At first, the discipline of Moon seemed to follow this regular
pattern: when the Department learned of his wildlife infraction, it suspended Moon, but did
not terminate him. Only after an investigation was made into Moon's background, which
supposedly uncovered an "abuse of position" charge, was Moon terminated. R.,37-38.
However, the CSRB concluded that there was no abuse of position. R.,134. Nevertheless,
the CSRB determined that the wildlife incident alone was sufficient to merit termination.
R.,134. This defies CSRB precedent, and is belied by the regular pattern of disciplinary
conduct displayed by the Department.4 Only after Moon commenced an action to fight his
termination did the Department claim that the wildlife violation was sufficient to terminate
Moon. At the time of the incident, however, this was not the case.5
The CSRB has issued a punishment against Moon which is inconsistent from those
rendered previously. In doing so, the CSRB ignored prior case law, and administered an
unprecedented punishment, thereby violating Utah Admin. Code. R. 137-1-21(D)(3). This
decision was therefore arbitrary and incorrectly applied the law, and should be overturned.

It is also belied by the fact that Nathan was terminated immediately, while Moon's
termination did not come until the investigation of other "wrongful acts" had been completed.
Moon's wildlife infraction occurred on or about December 7, 1996. However, Moon
did not receive a letter from Kimball (stating that Kimball was considering termination) until
January 30, 1997 - after the "abuse of position" charge had been concocted. Moon was
terminated a week later. R., 160, 173.
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III.

Mitigating Factors and Circumstances Were Ignored in Upholding
Moon's Termination.

As Moon stated in his briefs submitted to the CSRB, both Utah regulations and case
law require that an analysis of mitigating factors be engaged in before a penalty is imposed
upon a state employee. Because the CSRB failed to do so, its decision should be overturned.
The CSRB has its own "mitigating factors rule" at Utah Administrative Code R 1371-20(1), which states as follows:
Past Work Record. In those proceedings where a disciplinary penalty is at
issue, the past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of
either mitigating or sustaining the penalty in the event that the employee is
found guilty of the disciplinary charge alleged.
Further, a number of reported Utah cases and CSRB cases have recognized the
requirement of looking into mitigating circumstances. As the Hearing Officer in UDOT v.
Thomas V. Rasmussen, 2 PRB 19 (1986) explained, there are two questions which should
be asked in a termination case involving a public employee \ first, did the employee engage
in an act which, on its own, warrants dismissal; second, "do the relevant facts and
circumstances...mitigate against termination?" Id. at p. 28.

This second question was

largely ignored by the CSRB.
In Anderson and Weaver, the Board noted that before a penalty is issued, a hearing
officer should consider, "the presence of mitigating and/or extenuating circumstances, an
employee's service record, any disparity of treatment or selective enforcement of the rules,
the adequacy of forewarning or guidance, the consistency in the application of the rules and
procedures, the presence of discriminatory or preferential treatment, longevity of
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employment, and past rules violations." 3 PRB 22 at 5. Utilizing such factors, the Board
found that Weaver's actions did not merit termination. Id. at 21.
Other CSRB determinations have entire sections dedicated to mitigating
circumstances. In Rasmussen, 2 PRB 19, for instance, the Board made three pages of
findings concerning mitigating circumstances alone, despite the fact that the Board had
already found that the act complained of, on its own, merited termination. 2 PRB 19 at 28-31.
Based on these mitigating factors, the Board then reversed the decision to terminate.
In Trooper Joe C. Bennett v. Utah Highway Patrol. 2 PRB/H.O. 23 (1981), a police
officer was terminated for misappropriating funds and disobeying orders. The hearing officer
contributed five pages of independent findings of fact concerning mitigation, and used these
findings in his decision to set aside the officer's termination. The hearing officer looked at
various mitigating factors in order to assess whether termination was proper punishment.
These factors included: (1) the fact that the officer terminated had eleven years of service;
(2) the fact that the officer's employment record was exemplary; and (3) the fact that the
officer was held in high esteem by his colleagues. 2 PRB/H.O. 23 at 13,14; 24-29. Due to
these factors, the hearing officer held that the officer's dismissal would not advance the
public interest.6
In Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 949 P.2d 746, this Court
examined the termination of a police officer for dishonesty in the reporting of a shooting

It is interesting that the CSRB actually weighed Moon's public status against him (p.2021). It should also be noted that the Department has never disputed the fact that, until the incident
of December 7, 1997, Moon was a respected and valued state employee.
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incident. The Court noted that, while the officer may have been dishonest, mitigating
circumstances rendered his termination "so disproportionate under the facts...that it amounted
to an abuse of discretion". Id. at 762-763. Among such circumstances were the officer's
exemplary employment record, his twelve years of service without previous problems, the
fact that others were not terminated for similar incidents, and the fact that the evidence
against the officer was thin. Id. at 762. Due to the existence of such factors, this Court
overturned the officer's termination.
Finally, Utah Administrative Code R 477-1 l-l(3)(e) envisions as many as 9 factors
to consider as mitigating circumstances when analyzing the propriety of termination of a
state employee:
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
(V)
(VI)
(VII)
(VIII)
(IX)

consistent application of rules and standards
prior knowledge or rules and standards
severity of the infraction
the repeated nature of violations
prior disciplinary, corrective actions
previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions
the employee's past work record
the effect on agency operations
the potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property.

Despite the requirements contained in each of these rules and cases, almost no
attention was given by the CSRB to the assessment of mitigating factors in Moon's case. In
fact, the sum of such assessment was expressed in one sentence:
Although Grievant is a 15-year State employee (a mitigating factor), the nature
of his participation in the antelope incident along with his senior status at
DWR are so compelling (as aggravating factors), that his dismissal is neither
excessive, disproportionate nor otherwise constitute (sic) an abuse of
discretion.
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R., 154-155. This cursory analysis is woefully inadequate.
This analysis was also fundamentally unfair to Moon. Had the facts of this case been
properly analyzed according to each of the factors laid out in U.A.C. R 477-1 l-l(3)(e), it
would have been clear that these factors measure favorably for Moon. A brief analysis of
each factor is all that is necessary to demonstrate that this is so.
I.

Consistent application of rules and standards.

Moon has explained at length in section II of this brief, supra, that his termination was
not based on the consistent application of any given set of rules or standards. Instead, his
termination was quite extraordinary, since many employees have committed similar offenses
without being terminated by the Department. The Department departed from its consistent
application of punishment when it terminated Moon, a factor that weighs in Moon's favor.
II.

Prior knowledge of rules and standards.

At the time of the wildlife incident, Moon did not know he was in contravention of
a rule or regulation. Instead, at all relevant times, Moon thought he was in Utah, and his map
showed he was in Utah, where his son's hunt would have been legal. R., 872-879. This is
consistent with the fact that the CSRB could not find that Moon intentionally helped his son
on an illegal hunt, but only concluded that Moon "knew or should have known" where he
was, as all hunters should. R., 153. Moon believed he was in compliance with prior the
applicable rules and standards.
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III.

Severity of the infraction.

Moon was cited for a misdemeanor under Wyoming law for "aiding and assisting" his
son in taking an antelope out of season. R, 150. This infraction was extinguished by the
payment of a fine. Although Moon does not suggest to the Court that this infraction is
without significance, it certainly pales in comparison to the conduct of other Department
employees who were not terminated, such as Wayne Halverson, R., 919-920 (illegally shot
at ravens), Mike Hutchings and Ron Hodson, R., 395 (illegal hunting incidents), William
Bates, R., 923-924 (assisting in an illegal sheep hunt), Dennis Austin, R., 920-926 (took sage
grouse in a closed area), and Randy Berger, R. 346-347 (took an elk in a closed area).
Moon's infraction also pales with Dennis Weaver's conduct, who was reinstated. Originally,
the Department agreed with this analysis, as it merely suspended Moon for the infraction.R.,
146-147,893-897.
IV.

The repeated nature of violations.

This infraction was Moon's first in nearly twenty years of employment. R., 830-833.
V.

Prior disciplinary, corrective actions.

Moon has experienced no prior disciplinary actions of any type in his entire tenure
with the State of Utah. R., 830-833.
VI.

Previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions.

Moon was never warned in any fashion concerning his conduct as a state employee.
There was never any need. R., 830-833.
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VII.

Past work record.

Moon's work record has been exemplary. After receiving a Master's degree in
environmental biology, and a Pd.D. in genetics, Moon worked as genetic section manager
at Research Park, University of Utah. Later, Moon was hired by Governor Matheson as the
State Science Advisor. Moon continued in that position for the next 11 years, until 1993. R.,
824-827. Moon then transferred to the Department and served as Assistant Director of
Wildlife Resources until 1995, and then as Fields and Programs Administrator. During that
time, Moon had no record of discipline. R., 830-833; 15 CSRB/H.O. 218 at p.l.
VIII. Effect on agency operations.
The Department has been unable to cite to any discernible impact which Moon's
infraction had on agency operations. Although the CSRB noted the Department's vague and
general fears of "embarrassment" and "disrespect", there is no proof of any effect on the
workings of the Department. R., 152. The CSRB has previously held that such puffing will
not uphold a termination. See, Jan Wahlquist v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 15
CSRB/H.O. 220, and section 1(d), infra.
IX.

The potential of the violation for causing damage to persons or property.

Moon cannot deny that an antelope was killed on December 7, 1997. However, there
is no threat of future damage to persons or property. This was a single incident. Indeed, the
Department has not attempted to show that further damage will occur.
The CSRB never analyzed or answered the second question of the termination
calculus: do the relevant facts and circumstances mitigate against termination! The total
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lack of attention to mitigating factors and circumstances provided Moon with an unfair and
inappropriate punishment for a single incident. If the CSRB had seriously examined such
factors, Moonfs discharge would have been overturned. Because this omission ignored both
Utah regulatory law and case law, the decision of the CSRB should be overturned.
IV.

The "Nexus" Requirement Required by Law for Termination Based on
Off-Duty Activities is Absent.

One matter which was barely addressed (if at all) by the CSRB was the fact that
Moon's wildlife infraction occurred while he was off-duty. Moon was not on official
business when his son shot the antelope; instead, Moon was with his sons on a hunting trip.
Therefore, before Moon can be terminated for an infraction which occurred during this trip,
the Department must show a sufficient "nexus" between Moon's off-duty conduct and his
ability to perform his duties as an officer of the Department. Utah Dept. of Corrections v.
Despain. 824 P.2d 439, 446 (Utah 1991). This showing was insufficient as a matter of law.
Under Utah law, the Department had the burden of proving a nexus between an
employee's off-duty conduct and his public employment. Tolman v. Salt Lake County
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah App. 1991). Proving a nexus requires a showing that off
duty conduct "cast[s] significant doubt upon his ability to perform his job." Utah Dept. of
Corrections v. Despain. 824 P.2d 439,446, quoting Dexter v. Idaho Falls Citv Police Dept..
742 P.2d 434 (Idaho App. 1987). Mere conclusory statements that the employee's off-duty
conduct is inimical to the interests of the Department are not sufficient to meet that burden.
Tolman.. 818 P.2d at 31, n. 7.
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In its brief to the CSRB, the Department alleged that a nexus did exist between
Moon's conduct in Wyoming and his various positions with the Department. R. 104-107.
However, the Department provides no proof that such nexus actually existed, particularly
between Moon's conduct and his position at that time, Programs and Fields Administrator
("PFA"). Instead, the Department states that, "there is a significant and legitimate concern
for Agency as to what it's top management level does", R., 105, and that Moon did not fulfill
the "mission" of the Department. R., 104. This is not sufficient to show the required nexus
between Moon's off-duty conduct and his position with the Department. In Jan Wahlquist
v. Utah Dept. of Corrections. 15 CSRB/H.0.220, a director of the Department of Corrections
testified that an employee's violation was a "serious policy violation", that such violations
"might" cause problems with other employees and their fitness for duty. The Step 5 hearing
officer did not accept such general commentary:
"these broad policy statements and conclusions do not, in my opinion,
constitute substantial evidence [for termination]...if that were the case, any
violation of policy could easily be characterized as a serious violation meriting
termination...any violation of any policy could be characterized as serious in
that it indicates that an employee "might act inappropriately on the job or put
other...in jeopardy" to justify termination...Substantial evidence requires a
more fact intensive analysis.
Id. at p.21. The same is true here; despite vague and broad allegations that Moon's conduct
would have a serious impact on the Department, there was no proof that Moon was unable
to carry forth with his obligations as PFA, nor his abilities to perform his duties as PFA.
Nevertheless, the CSRB stated:
During his term as an assistant or deputy DWR director, Grievant had assigned
to him responsibility for the Law Enforcement Section of DWR. In that
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capacity Randy Moon was the manager over those DWR staff who held sworn
peace officer status. These are the people, who like Conservation Officer Jim
Gregory, enforce Utah's hunting laws and had the duty to curtail or prevent
illegal hunting activities. Randy Moon knew or should have known that he
may not become involved with the illegal killing of an antelope within
Wyoming's borders.
R. at 153. This is as close as the CSRB comes to discussing the requirement of nexus.
However, this discussion is both legally and factually deficient. At the time of the incident,
Moon was neither a manager of the Law Enforcement Section nor a peace officer. Instead
Moon was Fields and Programs Administrator. Therefore, the CSRB does not even address
the nexus between Moon's position and his off-dut^ conduct.
The CSRB neglects to show a link between Moon's conduct and his "ability to
perform his job duties". Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439,446. Moon was
not a peace officer or correctional officer at the time of the wildlife incident. Although Moon
has repeated this fact a number of times throughout this litigation, the Department has
continuously tried to impose upon Moon the nexus test which deals specifically with such
peace officers. However, the "nexus" test necessarily differs depending on the particular
employee under scrutiny. In the case of a peace officer, for example, scrutiny is higher, as
that employee's off-duty conduct must reflect, "a level of behavior that is, at all times, worthy
of public confidence and reflective of their ability, when on the job, to . . . react in a
reasonable manner to difficult situations." Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain. 824 P.2d
4395 446. However, for other employees, the "nexus" test does not reach so far. Instead, the
test requires that the off-duty activity significantly affect the employee's ability to perform
his particular job. For instance, in Kent v. Dept. of Employment Security. 860 P.2d 984,988
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(Utah App. 1993), this Court found that a fiduciary owed duties of honesty and trust to his
employer, and that a nexus was found between the employee's forgery and these duties. In
Thompson v. Civil Service Commission, 134 P.2d 188, the Commission wanted to remove
the city fire chief because the mayor was opposed to the chief drinking while off-duty.
However, the Court noted that the Commission could not penalize the chief for failing to
"conform to their personal standards", and held that the chief had not been terminated "for
cause". Id. at 195. In Blaine v. Moffat Ctv. School D. Re No. 1. 748 P.2d 1280, 1292-93
(Colo. 1987), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a teacher could be fired only for those
actions which showed an inability to teach. Accordingly, the nexus test will differ depending
on the acts involved and the position of the actor.
Moon was charged with a misdemeanor, to wit, aiding and assisting his son in the
unlawful taking of an antelope out of season - an infraction incurred in Wyoming. R., 150151. In order to fulfill the nexus requirement, it must be shown that this infraction somehow
adversely affected his ability to perform his job. No such showing was made by the
Department. Instead, as noted supra, the Department quoted broad policy statements and
conclusions that Moon's actions brought it "embarrassment" and "disrespect", which was
accepted wholesale by the CSRB. R., 152. This is error, as the CSRB should have required
"a more fact intensive analysis". Therefore, just as in Jan Wahlquist v. Utah Dept. of
Corrections, the Court should reject the CSRB's holding that Moon's conduct merits
termination, as there is no showing of (nor any real discussion about) nexus.
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Moon made a good-faith error as to where, exactly, he was on December 7, 1996.
When he was informed of his error, he made no denials, cooperated with authorities, and paid
a fine. R., 889-893. The Department and the CSRB have failed to show how such conduct
affected Moon's position as Field and Programs Administrator. Without this showing of
nexus, the Department cannot terminate Moon for off-duty conduct. Therefore, the CSRB's
decision should be overturned.
CONCLUSION
Moon's actions do not merit termination. Moon's wildlife violation lacks the
culpability required by prior CSRB and Utah case law for termination for cause. While Moon
may have made a mistake, this mistake does not deserve the drastic penalty of dismissal.
This penalty is simply not proportionate to the offense, as evidenced by the fact that
termination has not been considered appropriate for this type of conduct for other employees
and officers, including Dennis Weaver. Further, this penalty has been handed down without
any regard for mitigating circumstances, or the fact that Moon was off-duty at the time of the
incident.
Moon is entitled one reasonable mistake during a period of over fifteen years of loyal
and reputable service without being terminated for it. Moon therefore urges the Court to
overrule the CSRB's decision to uphold Moon's termination.
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